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Georges Bataille is known for being complex and multifaceted: influenced by Christian mystics as well as Hegelians and Marxists, his work is
also linked with that of the surrealists and existentialists of his own mid-20th
century France as well as the post-structuralists – in particular the Tel Quel
collaboraters – who followed in his wake. It would be astonishing, then, if
Bataille’s thinking were not conflated with precisely those movements and
those ideas with which he has so much in common, despite the fact that we
should refuse to expect this. Much of Bataille’s work was devoted to the
ambivalent overlapping of transgression and its reified containment, and
this in part explains why such a large number of his interpreters fall prey to
reducing the former category to the latter. This article is therefore an attempt to disentangle, to whatever extent possible, the transgressive from
the contained. I will do this on four accounts: postmodern economics, mystical union, sexual degradation, and historical dialectics.
COLLOQUY text theory critique 15 (2008). © Monash University.
www.colloquy.monash.edu.au/issue15/igrek.pdf
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Michael Richardson has proposed that it is today’s consumer society,
as opposed to the Aztec rituals which Bataille studied, that embodies a
principle of extreme waste.

1

Consumption, in the early stages of capital-

ism, was subordinated to the accumulation and rationalization of wealth.
The renewal of profit and its constant reinvestment in the productive apparatus is the ultimate calling for the ascetic bourgeoisie. This implies a
worldly activity which eradicates pleasure, extravagance, and irrational
spontaneity: “In fact, the summum bonum of this ethic, the earning of more
and more money, combined with the strict avoidance of all spontaneous
enjoyment of life, is above all completely devoid of any eudæmonistic, not
to say hedonistic, admixture.”

2

Late capitalism, however, is no longer re-

strained by the values of thrift or self-control. This is true on several fronts:
the indeterminacy of need, the spectacle of waste, and the inherent gambling of supply-side economics. For the commodity in its abundance, ac3

cording to Guy Debord, use-value has ceased to be an issue. We do not
create products to satisfy our needs; we create products to create the need
for those products. An absolute reversal in the restricted economy of bourgeois capitalism has given rise to the renewal and perpetual justification of
need in its ongoing destruction. The renewal of need is thus a metaphysical crisis with no end. But this at least supports an economy of chance
which dismantles the opposition between luxury and non-luxury: “Clearly, it
is only in a regime of luxury, where everything is superfluous, that demand
cannot be assigned and becomes open to possibilities that are less and
4

less predictable.” It might therefore be said that post-industrial capitalism
has finally turned away from its Protestant beginnings. Weber’s analysis
cannot be applied to a society which is no longer dominated by utility, prudence, or self-restraint. Bataille’s critique, that man has been reduced to
an objective thing, is equally irrelevant. Most troubling of all, an antibourgeois defense of capitalism rests squarely on Bataillean principles:
waste, expenditure, unpredictability, potlatch, and risk-taking.

5

The above assessment is ultimately incorrect. Goux distinguishes
himself from Bataille by claiming that political economy has always served
to undermine the utility of goods. But if this is true, then Bataille’s general
economics should apply evenly, except for historical adjustments, to all
stages of capitalism. We should not say that Bataille’s analysis falls short
at one stage but not another if anti-bourgeois economics is nothing new.
Furthermore, it is simply false to claim that Bataille was oblivious to the
radical denormativation of use-value in classical political economy. Besides contradicting Bataille’s statements on early capitalism in the Ac6

cursed Share, Goux’s thesis neglects the fundamental premise of general
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economics, that mankind’s economic activity necessarily pursues unlimited
ends.

7

The question isn’t so much whether we squander, but how we

squander. We might also expect, if Bataille subscribed to an absolute division between the medieval and capitalist economies, that he would portray
the religious works of the Middle Ages as devoid of all calculation. But
however the glory of God was displayed in the Roman Church, a super8

natural efficacy was presupposed. Indeed, the Protestant critique focused
precisely on the value of ceremony, ritual, confession, aesthetics, good
deeds, and superstition. The ensuing transformation in the regulation of
conduct therefore had much less to do with an introduction to rational utility
than with replacing one form of control with another: “It meant the repudiation of a control which was very lax, at that time scarcely perceptible in
practice, and hardly more than formal, in favour of a regulation of the whole
of conduct which, penetrating to all departments of private and public life,
was infinitely burdensome and earnestly enforced.”

9

In all times excess and the management of excess have coexisted.
But we should be careful to conclude that one is equivalent to the other
from an economic standpoint. Jean-Joseph Goux argues that political
economy, and especially postmodern culture, has erased the distinction between the sacred and the profane: “If one remains on strictly economic
ground, it is in truth impossible to separate productive consumption from
unproductive squandering. Ethical criteria alone could claim to make this
distinction.”

10

This assumes that the alienation of mankind has finally com-

pleted itself. Bataille, however, would never accept this position. Even as
he remains on the economic ground which he interrogates, Bataille affirms
that the totalizing domination of modern society, the reduction of mankind
to a technical activity, is less than complete.

11

Should we now believe, in a

developed capitalist economy, that the rational administration of social life
has been superseded by unlimited, uncontrolled expenditure?

12

Only if we assume that the total commodity, or the total spectacle, is
the final realization of Bataille’s immediacy. Goux himself suggests otherwise when he uses phrases like “abstract aestheticization” and “ideology of
consumption.”

13

Power is obviously at stake here, and this works against

his claim that the postmodern spectacle is a Bataillean transgression of
use-value.

14

Transgression, for Bataille, presupposes a limit to be crossed.

It is a lived experience in which utility and its violation are in constant tension; they are the maintained tension which Hollier speaks of in his essay
“The Dualist Materialism of Georges Bataille.”

15

This tension is itself the

result of a hostile relationship to nature, and for this reason it cannot be
equated with a fantasy of experience which lifts all prohibitions. If ours is
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an age of depthless images, through which the Other is wholly produced,
the world and the self are fully assimilated,
disappeared,
or obstacles.

18

19

17

16

and the historical has virtually

then we live without any surpassing of limits, prohibitions,
This is why, in his conclusion to “Expenditure and the Gen-

eral Economy,” Michael Richardson argues that Bataille’s theory of transgression cannot be reduced to an alienating spectacle of waste: “In point of
fact, capitalism does not escape the logic of Bataille’s dialectic: it does
spend and it spends quite as uselessly, quite as prodigally as any other society. What is missing from capitalism is not the fact of expenditure but any
sense of a joyous surpassing of limits.”

20

To the extent that we are drawn

to a seductive mingling of opposites, by virtue of which the simulacrum of
violence puts an end to violence,

21

a vital prohibition remains intact. We

lose ourselves in the commodity, but a calculating power is still at work; for
we do not lose ourselves in the immanence of others. We do not acknowledge, in the production of all things, the passions which unite us in death
and dying. If political economy has always encouraged loneliness and isolation, then we cannot argue that Bataille’s expenditure is the endorsement
of an ahistorical, post-bourgeois aestheticization of social life.

22

This is

why Roger Caillois, with whom Bataille collaborated, distinguished various
forms of excess expenditure.
One form of self-release that cannot be reduced to a simple individuality is the mystical point of communication. In this regard, Bataille is fond of
quoting the evangelical law: “Man must die that he may live.” It is not our
attachment to the self which raises us to the heights of mystical union with
God. We are transformed in God, we are in solitude with God, to the extent
that we are in submission to His will. We must therefore abandon ourselves to the will of God: “We can ascertain if we are in the right spiritual
state by whether we would have bliss and joy in abandoning and taking
leave of our own natural will and in going out of ourselves entirely in all
those things which God wills us to endure.”

23

This Eckhartian doctrine re-

quires an absolute unity of the will. It is by the desires of the flesh, as opposed to the highest powers of the soul, that we are distracted from the divine will of God. In place of these desires we ought to submit to God and
love one thing only: His eternal, uncreated goodness. As long as we are
motivated by the desires of the flesh, instead of the will of God, we are
necessarily divided against ourselves. Hence we are tempted by worldly
things even as our essence is constituted by the unchanging love of God.
It is unthinkable, then, that we might restore ourselves to God without transcending finite limitations and desires. The will of the flesh, which is given
to a multiplicity of transitory, external things, cannot be reconciled to a uni-
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fied truth. When we are consoled by God, when we are poor in spirit, we
are likewise transformed by His infinite goodness. That is to say, we are
necessarily taken outside of ourselves beyond space and time: “Where is
my final goal, toward which I should ascend? It is beyond all place.”

24

To

the extent that we are determined by creatures, from which all suffering
arises, it is impossible to surrender ourselves to an unbegotten-begetting of
love.

25

Temporal goods are merely a distraction to this magnificence and

beatitude of God. Accordingly, then, the mystics advise that we should not
concern ourselves with self-interest but become empty so that we might
ascend to His overflowing goodness. As for Silesius, we die so that we
may truly live: “Because through death alone we become liberated, I say
that it is the best of all the things created.”

26

God, in weakness, is more powerful than death. Christ upon the cross
is the weakness that we should bear within ourselves. It is not so much
that the mystics despise life, but in transcending the self to the point of suffering they are bound to God. The Christian mystic suffers for righteousness’ sake, which is to say that the meaning of suffering is transformed:
suffering for the sake of God is to enter into an exalted state of bliss. Suffering is the will of God, but the will of God remains unaffected by external
loss. Detachment from external loss, from the misfortunes of this world, is
to will suffering without suffering. As much as Bataille was influenced by
Hegel, Nietzsche, Weber, Mauss, and the Marquis de Sade, it would be
wrong to suggest that his various criticisms of Christian mysticism were unilateral, abstract, or one-sided. His views, to the end, were deeply informed
by Pseudo-Dionysius, Meister Eckhart, Teresa of Ávila, and Saint John of
the Cross. As Peter Tracey Connor has indicated, many of Georges
Bataille’s terms have been appropriated from the mystics: the point, abyss,
desert, ecstasy, intoxication, nudity, laying bare, incandescence, dramatization, abandonment, meditation. The will to suffering is likewise an important aspect to all of Bataille’s thinking: “If one proceeds right to the end, one
must efface oneself, undergo solitude, suffer severely from it, renounce being recognized: to be as though absent, insane over this, to undergo things
without will and without hope, to be elsewhere.”

27

The will is taken to the

limit of suffering which abolishes precisely that which enables this suffering:
the will to power ultimately destroys itself.

28

The subject is overcome and

affected by its experience, by its absorption into non-knowledge. In this
process the cohesion of knowledge is torn apart: the human intellectual apparatus cannot assimilate, subdue, or explain a shattering of the individual
which is pure ecstasy, i.e., the point of suffering which is indistinguishable
from divine love. Bataille therefore shares with mystics such as Pseudo-
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Dionysius a will to suffering, a will to self-destruction, and a will which cannot be recognized or apprehended by the human intellect: “For the truth is
that everything divine and even everything revealed to us is known only by
way of whatever share of them is granted. Their actual nature, what they
are ultimately in their own source and ground, is beyond all intellect and all
being and all knowledge.”

29

There is, nonetheless, a knowable horizon. The seal of God is complete goodness, and as such is the supreme cause of all things. This implies a real existence. It is possible that the reality of God transcends every
category of being, but this is not to say that God is equivalent to non-being.
By creating all things it is inevitable that God cannot be explained in terms
of being or non-being, but only as a kind of superabundance which is infinitely good. For this reason the passing things of this earth should not affect us. The goodness of God is beyond space and time, but it is no less a
supreme power which consoles us in everything: pain, affliction, disappointment, emotional distress, and hardship. We are the creatures of God,
we belong to God, and we participate in His goodness whensoever we
abandon ourselves to his unchanging will. Bataille, as might be expected,
will argue that the unknown has been surreptitiously linked to the known. A
fundamental identification has likewise been formed, and the self is demolished in order to be reconstituted on a higher level; that of timeless perfection. In this respect inner experience and mystical experience diverge: the
latter is a category of thought or subjectivity which ultimately satisfies our
will to knowledge.

30

One experience, as opposed to the other, provides us

with a calculated answer to passion, a hidden obstacle to the unknowable
depths of nature and ourselves: “By inner experience I understand that
which one usually calls mystical experience: the states of ecstasy, of rapture, at least of meditated emotion. But I am thinking less of confessional
experience, to which one has had to adhere up to now, than of an experience laid bare, free of ties, even of an origin, of any confession whatever.
This is why I don’t like the word mystical.”

31

The difference formulated here isn’t merely epistemic. The good person who participates in the eternal reproduction of goodness is emptied of
creatures and filled with a pure light. In this way the will of man and the will
of God are united in a timeless fashion, distinct from the internal struggles
of flesh, embodiment, temptation, and suffering. The mystical experience
is divine agony, undoubtedly, but is moreover the relinquishment of self to
the point of an absolute separation between good and evil. All of the evils
of this world do not reach or penetrate the divine heavens.

32

God does not

suffer. God is not afflicted by pain or evil, but eliminates fear and anguish
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in His followers. For this reason Bataille’s theory of transgression should
not be confused with a transcendence of being which is strictly demarcated
from worldly imperfection. The sacred realm, for Bataille, is not distinct from
that which horrifies us. Hypostatizing the good as a transcendental power
is a calculated renunciation of self: “At some moment or another I must either abandon myself to chance or keep myself under control, like the religious vowed to continence. The intervention of will, the decision to keep
clear of death, sin, and spiritual anguish, makes nonsense of the free play
of indifference and renunciation. Without such free play, the present instant is subordinated to preoccupation with the time to come.”

33

The Marquis de Sade’s philosophy is dominated by a single principle:
affirm sovereignty. There are no moral limits to sovereignty because all
limits, from a demythologized perspective, are illusory. It might therefore
be argued that sovereignty is the overcoming of boundaries, especially
those which have themselves been determined by human weakness. Morality, religion, and social regulation are each derived from the human disposition which cowers before Nature. Their inventions are purely fantastic,
and the sovereign individual seeks to undermine them at every opportunity.
It should come as no surprise, then, to observe the most extraordinary
tastes put on display and defended in the writings of de Sade. For every
desire arises from the inner constitution of an individual person, from a
combination of the senses and the imagination. To satisfy one’s desire is a
purely subjective phenomenon; it is the fulfillment of those drives and impulses which have been provided to us by Nature.

34

In a certain sense,

sovereign pleasure is nothing else than the consummation of desire regardless of moral restrictions. But the libertine is not interested in all pleasures:
he seeks out only the depraved, immoderate, horrific ones: “If ’tis the filthy
thing which pleases in the lubricious act, then certainly the more filthy the
thing, the more it should please, and it is surely much filthier in the corrupted than in the intact and perfect object.”

35

It follows from this that nothing is so degrading or repulsive that it
might hinder a sovereign’s taste for criminal passion. There are absolutely
no boundaries to pleasure. It is not uncommon for the Sadean hero to
drink urine, swallow excrement, or have his anus sewn tight with a sharp
needle and spool of cobbler’s thread. The filthiest sexual acts are recommended, profanation is ineluctable, and the infliction of pain, to either victim
or libertine, is omnipresent. We mustn’t suppose that these aberrations in
taste are intrinsically vile, for they depend upon our individual constitutions,
our faculties and affections, which are themselves perfectly natural. It is
likewise a fallacy to infer moral consequences from the majority perspective: if an object is found to be disagreeable to the largest number of peo-
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ple, and it is only a few individuals who are attracted to it, this tells us nothing about its inherent goodness.

36

In the Marquis’s universe, everything is

permitted. The rightness of an action is made acceptable by its very existence: there is not a single thing, object, or action which is contrary to Nature. But are we thus any closer to explaining why it is that the libertine is
attracted to crime, murder, rape, and all things repulsive? This question
leads us to the heart of sovereign debauchery and what Jean Paulhan has
described as the Marquis de Sade’s inexplicable secret.
The secret – if I may say so – is that the Marquis is a masochist. What
is broached here is a point of convergence: the laws of pleasure ultimately
yield to a cessation of feeling, to an absolute egoism which is unrestrained
in its destruction of limits. Insofar as the ego is its own concrete limit, it
must be destroyed. Absolute egoism is just that process of negation enjoined by the sovereign attitude: “[I]t is the act of a soul which, having destroyed everything within itself, has accumulated an immense strength
which will completely identify itself with the act of a total destruction which it
prepares.”

37

This act or process of annihilation culminates in a philosophy

of indifference. It is, perhaps, the attitude of indifference which finally realizes the sadistic impulse: the victim’s torment coincides exactly with the voluptuary’s pleasure. To the extent that sadistic crimes take pleasure in absolute egoism, in the confines or freedom of solitude, it is essential that the
sovereignty of pleasure remains numb to the suffering of others. The libertine affirms a perpetual state of warfare in which all of us are born “isolated,
envious, cruel, and despotic.”

38

Under these conditions it would be impos-

sible, without a lessening of pleasure, to have empathy for those who are
tortured and persecuted. A moral deception, such as guilt or human solidarity, is a mediated comfort which lacks the intensity of crime, blasphemy,
and erotic cruelties. The scream of a victim only proves her abject isolation
in a world of disorder. The pain, however, is not unbearable. As Roland
Barthes writes in Sade, Fourier, Loyola: “The scream is the victim’s mark:
she makes herself a victim because she chooses to scream; if, under the
same vexation, she were to ejaculate, she would cease to be a victim,
would be transformed into a libertine.”

39

This explains why the victim’s

frenzy is necessarily conjoined to the criminal’s: they are each reacting, albeit differently, to the same monstrosity of a world. The sovereign embraces that which most of us, as victims, decry. To the extent that absolute
egoism is a mode of apathy which embraces the isolation of all individuals,
it will always be viewed as a principle of sadistic violence by those who are
its victims. But how is it that sadism merges with masochism? And why is
such a phenomenon, at least for the Marquis de Sade, dependent upon a
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dialectical relation with abject eroticism?
It is certain that the Sadean hero is self-centered. It is equally certain
that his heroes exceed, or attempt to exceed, the preliminary demarcations
of self-centeredness by an explosion of barriers. Absolute egoism is the rationalistic method to such an explosion. This entails the destruction of empathy, for every moral affection is a consequence of weakness. Individuality is affirmed to the point of breaking off all mediated ties with others, and
sexuality is viewed as sadistic in precisely this manner. What is essential is
the meaning of pleasure qua criminal: it is its rationality which counts for
everything. The transformation of the self in this process of becoming sovereign indicates a denial of others as well as oneself: the sadistic voluptuary eliminates every feeling which is a sign of losing control or being affected from the outside. “Never in his stories does sensual pleasure appear
as self-forgetfulness, swooning, or abandon,” writes Simone de Beauvoir.
“The male aggression of the Sadean hero is never softened by the usual
transformation of the body into flesh. He never for an instant loses himself
in his animal nature; he remains so lucid, so cerebral, that philosophic discourse, far from dampening his ardor, acts as an aphrodisiac.”

40

The ab-

sence of shared pleasures in the Sadean network of eroticism is the direct
result of this rationalized self-control. The autonomy of the self-enclosed
subject obviates any kind of debauchery which is vulnerable to outside affections: every point of contact with the other is a manifestation of strength,
superiority, and dominance. Such dominance, however, is exercised over
the sovereign as much as the victim. Despite the fact that neither of them
share in common pleasures or experiences, they are equally determined by
a systematic exploitation of the emotions. The inside is transformed into
something dead, unfeeling, and criminal. While the victim’s scream is one
response to such a horrifying situation, the sovereign’s ejaculation is another.
This implies that the sovereign undergoes the same torture as the victim, and that his cruelest pleasures are fundamentally sadomasochistic.
The one who is powerful is set ablaze by an impersonal crime: we are all
victims of Nature, but the affirmation of sovereignty transforms a passive
sacrifice into the rationality of pleasure. To the extent that pleasure is derived from pain, from the affirmation of solitude, it is impossible to separate
an erotic charge from its abject, impersonal circumstances. The form of
crime is dialectically related to that which it overcomes and subsumes. If
passion is the epitome of crime, it shows its defiance by an affirmation of
the aged, ugly, hideous, foul, and detestable. The difference between
moralists and voluptuaries, then, is structured by their respective constitutions: the former are attracted to moral pleasures while “the opposite is the
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case for vigorous spirits who are far more delighted by powerful shocks imparted to what surrounds them than they would be by the delicate impressions the feeble creatures by whom they are surrounded inevitably prefer.”

41

At the pinnacle of crime the libertine becomes insensitive to all

shocks. When this stage has been reached there is nothing to fear: the
greatest sensual satisfactions are contingent upon radical transformations
of being. To be enslaved is to act according to the impulsions of fear; to be
liberated is to overcome every anxious state, to affirm the perpetual motion
of Nature which culminates, for each of us, in the absurdity of death.
The denial of humanity implicit in our most destructive instincts is
shared by the Marquis de Sade and Georges Bataille. A fear of death may
prevent us from seeing any validity or universality in these instincts, but we
are no less implicated by their devastating consequences.

42

A total de-

struction of human limitations is foreshadowed by our own existence, and
in this regard humanity is haunted by its inexorable disappearance. The
Sadean lawbreaker is enticed by the obliteration of social barriers, and
thus, paradoxically, affirms his own death. In this way a practice of indifference toward death, as well as any transformation of being, is conceived as
a political weapon. The sovereign attains freedom by transcending his
concrete relations with others. For Bataille, however, this transcendence
cannot be self-consciously realized. We are apathetic, in a variety of
senses, but we are also human, which is to say that we are necessarily
anxious:
The figure of de Sade is certainly unsympathetic to people moved by
need and by fear. The sympathies and the dreads – the cowardice too,
one must add – which determine men’s usual behaviour are diametrically
opposed to the passions responsible for the sovereignty of the voluptuary.
But this sovereignty is significant because of our wretchedness, and one
would be mistaken not to see in the reactions of an anxious man – an affectionate and cowardly man – an immutable necessity; to put it precisely,
pleasure itself demands dread as a proper reaction.
Sovereignty is therefore marked by failure.

44

43

We do not transgress

the law without first giving it an objective content, and it is just this content
which is motivated by fear and disgust. To overcome fear is to acknowledge its real negativity, which implies, at least for Kojève, a dynamic notion
of history.
Kojève’s reading of Hegel emphasizes the result of self-consciousness
as a revelation of being which cannot be predetermined. This revelation is
a synthesis of space and time, nature and history. On this model, history is
founded upon the notion that spirit is nothingness: the subject is a temporal
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nonbeing which is itself the nihilation of space, nature, and being. Hence,
the revelation of being is mediated by its absence: history is a dynamic
process of sublimating that which does not exist. Human desire is not a
thing; it is a non-natural object which transcends the given reality of nature.
But for self-consciousness to realize itself as a permanent lack of being, as
a completely free individual to be recognized by others, it must first of all
risk its biological existence in a life and death struggle.

45

It is only through

this struggle that immediate self-consciousness overcomes itself and experiences the fear of death in a humanizing fashion. For Kojève,
Man became a Slave because he feared death. To be sure, on the
one hand this fear reveals his dependence with respect to Nature
and thus justifies his dependence with respect to the Master, who
dominates Nature. But on the other hand, this same fear ... has a
positive value, which conditions the Slave’s superiority to the Master.
Through animal fear of death the Slave experienced the dread or the
Terror of Nothingness, of his nothingness.

46

Servile consciousness, in other words, is the beginning of actualized freedom. After having glimpsed his nothingness, the slave channels his fear
into the concrete action of work. It is by means of this concrete action that
the slave is able to understand himself in relation to others. Knowledge
and action are therefore historically situated: the transformation of subjective certainty into human reality depends upon the concrete negations of
both space and time.

47

Although it is true that nothingness is at the basis

of history and time, self-consciousness, or spirit, is realized through its objective determinations.

48

By working on nature, self-consciousness reflects

itself outside of itself in a historical progression which ultimately yields universal recognition. This final stage of absolute knowledge, which is perforce real and concrete, is a maintained form of nothingness, that is to say,
of freedom. It is born from desire and reflected in work. But to the extent
that work is work for another, in conformity to an idea which is hostile to the
worker, the end of history which finally surpasses work cannot be predetermined.

49

For Kojève, human desire is structured by a value which raises it
above simple, undivided immediacy. Freedom, the object of human desire,
is mediated through action. The first action which distinguishes human
nothingness from biological necessity is the fight for recognition. It is precisely this fight which marks the advent of deliberate evolution, that is to
say, of historical self-consciousness. The project of human desire is thus
conditioned by risk, confrontation, and struggle: “In other words, man’s hu-
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manity ‘comes to light’ only if he risks his (animal) life for the sake of his
human Desire.”

50

Without a doubt, this risk of immediate life for human life

is teleological: it is done for the sake of creating something new, something
which doesn’t yet exist. Man’s humanity is developed by an action which is
itself the annihilation of present being in favor of future being. The fight for
recognition, in this case, desires a fundamental substitution of values
whereby animal life is subordinated to the establishment of autonomous existence. The risk, nevertheless, is real.

51

It may also be intentional, but for

exactly this reason it is related to an ideal: the teleological action which determines the risk is based upon a future goal which has yet to be created,
and therefore cannot be said to exist in a predetermined fashion. For Kojève, since “Spirit is the identity of Being and the Subject, one can deduce
from it the earlier opposition of the two and the process that overcomes that
opposition. But starting with the initial opposition, one can deduce neither
its being finally overcome, nor the process that leads to it.”

52

The future is a phenomenological opening only to those who desire it,
to those who seek to change the world. It is the result of a dialectical, historical negation (or set of negations), as opposed to being a given reality.
The revelation of being therefore presupposes the very time which it supersedes. As a monument to its historical past, the reconciliation of space and
time preserves their opposition: it is the concrete realization of nothingness
which is embedded in nature, or static being. The overcoming of time is
concrete, which is to say that it maintains exactly that which it annihilates:
the destructive, unforeseeable consequences of history. If these consequences were fully determined in advance, from the beginning, then space
and time could never be reconciled, for they would not have been opposed
to one another. It is thus only by risking his life, by opposing himself to his
natural, immediate instincts, that man achieves self-awareness and rises
above “mere animal sentiment of self.”

53

Kojève’s phenomenological anthropology is one of action, history, and
desire. It is a theory of dynamic change motivated by existential nothingness. Self-consciousness is no longer based upon a model of the understanding which is passively taken up by its object of contemplation.

54

To

the contrary, human desire is an action which creates itself in opposition to
the given reality of being: “[I]n order to realize itself, Desire must be related
to a reality; but it cannot be related to it in a positive manner. Hence it must
be related to it negatively. Therefore Desire is necessarily the Desire to
negate the real or present given.”

55

Human desire is a transformative ab-

sence, which is to say that it is related to being as the negation of being.
For Kojève, the presence of absence is only realized to the extent that it re-
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lates itself to its other, to that which serves as an obstacle to human selfconsciousness. There is no time without space. There is no selfconsciousness without the immediacy of being which is negated, transformed, and sublimated via work. Time exists for us, that is to say, by
means of an action which creates the future, past, and present.

56

It is for

this reason that Kojève argues that the real endures in time as its own remembrance: “[T]he historical movement arises from the Future and passes
through the Past in order to realize itself in the Present or as temporal Present.”

57

To negate the real is to preserve it as memory. The actualization

of time is the result of a humanizing process: man creates the future by
transforming a given-reality into a recognizable concept, meaning, or essence. But at the end of history man’s concept of himself, and concept of
the world, is finally completed: the abstraction of meaning from concrete
reality is no longer determined by human negativity. Henceforth it is the
comprehension of negativity which surpasses negativity. One might therefore contend that post-historical consciousness has regressed to the passive, contemplative stage of understanding; but in fact there is a critical difference between the first and last stages of human desire: the abstraction
of meaning which completes history presupposes the radical negativity
which it overcomes.

58

All action is the remembrance of a thing which

ceases to be a thing: it is the transformation of being, or given-reality, into
the real past. The object of post-historical consciousness is therefore a
process of absorbing and assimilating historical action. The eternal truth is
the absorption of history.
Nevertheless, a subterfuge remains and resides in the fact that posthistorical negativity is useless.

59

The free activity which is a kind of de-

struction without destruction, or negation without negation, is the abiding
recollection of nothingness. It is the remembrance of time. But this implies
a collapse of the past and present into a constant, unrelenting awareness
of one’s own mortality. Hence the subterfuge: “In order for man to reveal
himself ultimately to himself, he would have to die, but he would have to do
it while living – watching himself ceasing to be. In other words, death itself
would have to become (self-) consciousness at the very moment that it annihilates the conscious being.”

60

Perpetual awareness of dialectical fini-

tude is either a subterfuge or it requires one: it is merely an abstract ruse to
the extent that it claims to exist as both consciousness and the death of
consciousness. It is more than a ruse if it is not simply the consciousness
or philosophy of death, but likewise the negativity which exceeds itself as
the necessity for useless action, a necessity which is better described as a
“malaise” when it reconciles truth and desire.

61
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The malaise that afflicts us at the end of history, when all things have
been finished or performed, can only be explained by the urgent need to
act even in a world which is fully assimilated to our humanizing, collective
desires. We are not satisfied by satisfaction alone. The man of recognized
negativity, who has everything to lose, will subject his negativity once more
to the unforeseeable possibilities of death and nothingness: “Thus, once
again, he discovers something “to do” in a world where, from the point of
view of actions, nothing is done anymore. And what he has “to do” is to
satisfy the portion of existence that is freed from doing.”

62

It may be true

that the past is formed by the future and thereby determines the real quality
of the real present.

63

The present, however, is no less revealing than the

past: at each and every step it is the manifestation of time as a dialectical
result.

64

Bataille writes that Hegel “did not know to what extent he was

right,” which means in this context that the real present, including that of
post-historical consciousness, is conditioned by the very negativity from
which it is derived.

65

There is no limit, human or otherwise, to the over-

coming of man in favor of space, nature, and being. In every way possible
the life and death of mankind will be forgotten, and at the end of history the
revelation of being, or the coming together of space and time, will occur at
precisely the moment when it is released from time altogether.
Inasmuch as sensuality and prohibition, luxury and non-luxury, are
categories of human existence which cannot be separated, which necessarily overlap, there is a nearly invisible line which unites and distinguishes
them. This does not imply, however, that transgression is fully explained
by the historical context from which it arises. We are torn by the sensuality
of a moment which amplifies self-identity to the point of overcoming itself: “I
matter insofar as I am in the world, not as a stranger in closure and selfisolation, but as a particle of energy blending into the light. Thus I see that
if I am to live, it is on the following tragic condition: that, relinquishing this
life of mine, I give myself to that which knows nothing of me, to that which
is exterior to myself.”

66

Bataille’s thought is counter-intuitive to those post-

structuralists who privilege the reversibility of social categories by deconstructing the myth of an absolute outside.

67

By positing an exterior world

indifferent to the exigencies of human action, and which can be used to
consolidate the foundations of autonomous subjectivity, it would appear
that Bataille has foreclosed the possibility of a politically informed critique of
self-identity.

68

In his writing, however, it is precisely the tragic condition of

self-sacrifice which opens up the self to its own impossibility, to its inexorable overcoming. The metaphysics of death, for Bataille, ensures the precariousness of self-identity which is never complete, never still, never
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closed. I have elaborated four strategies of containment in relation to this
precariousness, none of which should be confused with Bataillean principles of loss, expenditure, or excess. The basic form of containment, in
each of the four strategies, is constituted by a leveling down of the outside
world to an objectified presence. But this is not to argue, in conclusion, that
Bataillean transgression is merely negative or reactive. It is opposed to the
processes of containment on a singular condition, and this condition is fulfilled in the affirmation of energy which can never be reduced to a closed
economy of signs. It is impossible to affirm transgression apart from its
prohibitions, apart from the very categories of reactionary politics which it
seeks to rupture, but it is equally impossible to affirm values without likewise affirming their unequivocal dissolution. Transgression is precisely this
affirmation.
Central Washington University
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